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Abstract. Bots, software-controlled accounts that operate on social me-
dia, have been used to manipulate and deceive. We studied the charac-
teristics and activity of bots around major political events, including
elections in various countries. In this chapter, we summarize our findings
of bot operations in the context of the 2016 and 2018 US Presidential
and Midterm elections and the 2017 French Presidential election.
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1 Introduction
Social media have been widely portrayed as enablers of democracy [50,48,15,12,47].
In countries were freedom to communicate and organize lacked, social media
provided a platform to openly discuss political [2,25,9,13,23,55,87] and social is-
sues [38,37,18,19,82,8,77], without fears for safety or retaliation. Such platforms
have also been used to respond to crises and emergencies [75,88,34,89,49]. It is
hard to overstate the importance of these platforms for the billions of people
who use them every day, all over the world.
However, as it happens with most powerful emerging technologies, the rise of
popularity led to abuse. Concerns about the possibility of manipulating public
opinion using social media have been brought a decade before they material-
ized [39]. Ample evidence was provided by the scientific community that social
media can influence people’s behaviors [5,14,45,32,60,31]. These concerns have
been corroborated by numerous recent studies [66,58,26,27,40,68,81,28].
Social media can be used to reach millions of people using targeted strate-
gies aimed to maximize the spread of a message. If the goal is to manipulate
public opinion, one way to achieve it is by means of bots, software-controlled
social media accounts whose goal is to mimic the characteristics of human users,
while operating at much higher pace at substantially no downside for their oper-
ators. Bots can emulate all basic human activity on social media platforms, and
they become increasingly more sophisticated as new advancements in Artificial
Intelligence emerge [41,57,30,80,70].
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In this chapter, we focus on the use of bots to manipulate the political dis-
course. The first anecdotal accounts of attempts to steer public opinion on Twit-
ter date back to the 2010 US Midterm election [65] and similarly during the 2010
US Senate special election in Massachusetts [62,58], where bots were used to gen-
erate artificial support for some candidates and to smear their opponents.
Attribution, i.e., the determination of the actors behind such operations,
has proven challenging in most such cases [30]. One notorious exception is repre-
sented by the attribution of an interference campaign occurred during the 2016
US Presidential election to a Russian-sponsored operation. This was as a result
of a thorough investigation on Russian interference led by the US Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). They found that “The Russian government
interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election with the goal of harming the
campaign of Hillary Clinton, boosting the candidacy of Donald Trump, and in-
creasing political and social discord in the United States.”1 Numerous studies
have investigated the events associated with this operation [44,10,7].
It is worth noting that bots have been used for other purposes, for exam-
ple social spam and phishing [42,78,69,43,85,61,79,29]. Albeit much work has
been devoted to the challenges of detecting social spam [56,35,90] and spam
bots [51,52,72,11,61], only recently the research community started to investi-
gate the effects that bots have on society, political discourse, and democracy.
The goal of this chapter is to summarize some of the most important results in
this space.
Contributions of this chapter
The aim of this chapter is to connect results of our investigations into three
major political events: (i) the 2016 US Presidential election; (ii) the 2017 French
Presidential election; and (iii) the 2018 US Midterm elections. We will discuss
the role of bots in these events, and highlight the influence they had on the
online political discourse. The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
– We first provide a brief overview of how bots operate and what are the
challenges in detecting them. Several recent surveys have been published on
the problem of characterizing and detecting bots [71,86], including our own
on Communications of the ACM [30].
– We then illustrate our first, and maybe the most prominent, use case of bots-
driven interference in political discourse, discussing how bots have been used
during the 2016 US Presidential election to manipulate the discussion of the
presidential candidates. This overview is based on our results that appeared
prior to the November 8, 2016 election events [10].
– We then illustrate how bots have been used to spread disinformation prior
to the 2017 French Presidential election to smear Macron’s public image.
1 See Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_interference_in_the_
2016_United_States_elections
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– Finally, we overview recent results that suggest how bots have been evolving
over the course of the last few years, focusing on the 2018 US Midterm
elections, and we discuss the challenges associated to their detection.
2 Anatomy of a bot
2.1 What is a bot
In this chapter, we define as bot (short for robot, a.k.a., social bot, social media
bot, social spam bot, or sybil account) a social media account that is predomi-
nantly controlled by software rather than a human user. Although the definition
above inherently states nothing about the intents behind creating and operat-
ing a bot, according to published literature, malicious applications of bots are
reported significantly more frequently than legitimate usage [30,71].
While in this chapter we will focus exclusively on bots that aim to manipulate
the public discourse, it is worth nothing that some researchers have used bots
for social good [60,4], as illustrated by a recent taxonomy that explores the
interplay between intent and characteristics of bots [71]. Next, we describe some
techniques to create and detect bots.
2.2 How to create a bot
In the early days of online social media, in the late 2000s, creating a bot was not
a simple task: a skilled programmer would need to sift through various platforms’
documentation to create a software capable of automatically interfacing with the
front-end or the back-end, and operate functions in a human-like manner.
These days, the landscape has completely changed: indeed, it has become
increasingly simpler to deploy bots, so that, in some cases, no coding skills
are required to setup accounts that perform simple automated activities: tech
blogs often post tutorials and ready-to-go tools for this purposes. Various source
codes for sophisticated social media bots can be found online as well, ready to
be customized and optimized by the more technically-savvy users [44].
We recently inspected same of the readily-available Twitter bot-making tools
and compiled a non-comprehensive list of capabilities they provide [10,28].
Most of these bots can run within cloud services or infrastructures like Ama-
zon Web Services (AWS) or Heroku, making it more difficult to block them when
they violate the Terms of Service of the platform where they are deployed.
A very recent trend is that of providing Bot-As-A-Service (BaaS): Advanced
conversational bots powered by sophisticated Artificial Intelligence are provided
by companies like ChatBots.io that can be used to carry digital spam campaigns
[29] and scale such operations by automatically engaging with online users.
Finally, the increasing sophistication of Artificial Intelligence (AI) models,
in particular in the area of neural-based natural language generation, and the
availability of large pre-trained models such as OpenAI’s GPT-2 [64], makes it
easy to programmatically generate text content. This can be used to program
bots that produce genuine-looking short texts on platforms like Twitter, making
it harder to distinguish between human and automated accounts [3].
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2.3 How to detect bots
The detection of bots in online social media platform has proven a challenging
task. For this reason, it has attracted a lot of attention from the computing re-
search community. Even DARPA, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, became interested and organized the 2016 DARPA Twitter Bot Detec-
tion [74], with University of Maryland, University of Southern California, and
Indiana University topping the challenge, focused on detecting bots pushing anti
vaccination campaigns. Large botnets have been identified on Twitter, from dor-
mant [24,24], to very active [1].
The literature on bot detection has become very extensive. We tried to sum-
marize the most relevant approaches in a survey paper recently appeared on
the Communications of the ACM [30]: In that review, we proposed a simple
taxonomy to divide the bot detection approaches into three classes: (i) bot
detection systems based on social network information; (ii) systems based on
crowd-sourcing and leveraging human intelligence; (iii) machine learning meth-
ods based on the identification of highly-predictive features that discriminate
between bots and humans. We refer the interested reader to that review for a
deeper analysis of this problem [30]. Other recent surveys propose complemen-
tary or alternative taxonomies that are worth considering as well [71,20,20,86].
As of today, there are a few publicly-available tools that allow to do bot de-
tection and study social media manipulation, including (i) Botometer,2 a pop-
ular bot detection tool developed at Indiana University [21], (ii) BotSlayer,3 an
application that helps track and detect potential manipulation of information
spreading on Twitter, and (iii) the Bot Repository,4 a centralized database to
share annotated datasets of Twitter social bots.
In conclusion, several algorithms have been published to detect bots using
sophisticated machine learning techniques including deep learning [46], anomaly
detection [59,36,22], and time series analysis [16,73].
3 Social media manipulation
Bots have been reportedly used to interfere in political discussions online, for
example by creating the impression of an organic support behind certain political
actors [62,65,66,58]. However, the apparent support can be artificially generated
by means of orchestrated campaigns with the help of bots. This strategy is
commonly referred to as social media astroturf [66].
3.1 2016 US Presidential Election
Our analysis of social media campaigns during the 2016 US Presidential Election
revealed the presence of social bots. We here summarize our findings first pub-
lished in [10], discussing data collection, bot detection, and sentiment analysis.
2 Botometer: https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/
3 BotSlayer: https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/
4 Bot Repository: https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/bot-repository/
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Data Collection. We manually crafted a list of hashtags and keywords related
to the 2016 US Presidential Election with 23 terms in total, including 5 terms
specifically for the Republican Party nominee Donald Trump, 4 terms for the
Democratic Party nominee Hillary Clinton, and the remainder terms relative to
the four presidential debates. The complete list of search terms is reported in
our paper [10]. By querying the Twitter Search API between September 16 and
October 21, 2016, we collected a large dataset. After post-processing and cleaning
procedures, we studied a corpus constituted by 20.7 million tweets posted by
nearly 2.8 million distinct users.
Bot detection. We used Botometer v1 (the version available in 2016) to de-
termine the likelihoood that the most active accounts in this dataset were con-
trolled by humans or were otherwise bots. To label accounts as bots, we use the
fifty-percent threshold—which has proven effective in prior studies [30,21]—an
account was considered to be a bot if the bot score was above 0.5. Due to the
Twitter API limitations, it would have been impossible to test all the 2.78 mil-
lion accounts in short time. Therefore, we tested the top 50 thousand accounts
ranked by activity volume, which account for roughly 2% of the entire popu-
lation and yet are responsible for producing over 12.6 million tweets, which is
about 60% of the total conversation. Of the top 50 thousand accounts, Botome-
ter classified as likely bots a total of 7,183 users (nearly 15%), responsible for
2,330,252 tweets; 2,654 users were classified as undecided, because their scores
did not significantly diverge from the classification threshold of 0.5; the rest—
about 40 thousand users (responsible for just 10.3 million tweets, less than 50%
of the total)—were labeled as humans. Additional statistics are summarized in
our paper [10].
Sentiment analysis. We leveraged sentiment analysis to quantify how bots
(resp., humans) discussed the candidates. We used SentiStrength [76] to de-
rive the sentiment scores of each tweet in our dataset. This toolkit is especially
optimized to infer sentiment in short informal texts, thus ideally suited for so-
cial media. We tested it extensively in prior studies on the effect of sentiment
on tweets’ diffusion [32,33]. The algorithm assigns to each tweet t a positive
P+(t) and negative P−(t) polarity score, both ranging between 1 (neutral) and
5 (strongly positive/negative). Starting from the polarity scores, we captured
the emotional dimension of each tweet t with one single measure, the sentiment
score S(t), defined as the difference between positive and negative polarity scores:
S(t) = P+(t)− P−(t). The above-defined score ranges between -4 and +4. The
negative extreme indicates a strongly negative tweet, and occurs when P+(t) = 1
and P−(t) = 5. Vice-versa, the positive extreme identifies a strongly positive
tweet labeled with P+(t) = 5 and P−(t) = 1. In the case P+(t) = P−(t)—
positive and negative sentiment scores for a tweet t are the same—the sentiment
S(t) = 0 of tweet t is considered neutral as the polarities cancel each other out.
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Fig. 1. Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of replies interactions
generated by bots (left) and humans (right) (from [10]).
Fig. 2. Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of retweets interac-
tions generated by bots (left) and humans (right) (from [10]).
Partisanship and Supporting Activity. We used a simple heuristic based
on the 5 Trump-supporting hashtags and the 4 Clinton-supporting to attribute
user partisanships. For each user, we calculated their top 10 most used hashtags:
If the majority supported one particular candidate, we assigned the given user
to that political group (Clinton or Trump supporter). Compared to network-
based techniques [17,6], this simple partisanship assignment yielded a smaller yet
higher-confidence annotated dataset, constituted by 7,112 Clinton supporters
(590 bots and 6,522 humans) and 17,202 Trump supporters (1,867 bots and
15,335 humans).
Summary of Results: Engagement. Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the
Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions (CCDFs) of replies and retweets
initiated by bots and humans in three categories: (i) within group (for example
bot-bot, or human-human); (ii) across groups (e.g., bot-human, or human-bot);
and, (iii) total (i.e., bot-all and human-all). The heavy-tailed distributions, typ-
ically observed in social systems, appear in both. Hence, further inspection of
Fig. 1 suggests that (i) humans replied significantly more to other humans than
to bots and, (ii) conversely, bots receive replies from other bots significantly
more than from humans. One hypothesis is that unsophisticated bots could not
produce engaging-enough questions to foster meaningful exchanges with humans.
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Figure 2, however, demonstrates that retweets were a much more vulnerable
mode of information diffusion: there is no statistically significant difference in
the amount of retweets that humans generated by resharing content produced
by other humans or by bots. In fact, humans and bots retweeted each other
substantially at the same rate. This suggests that bots were very effective at
getting their messages reshared in the human communication channels.
Our study highlighted a vulnerability in the information ecosystem at that
time, namely that content was reshared often without a thorough scrutiny on
the information source. Several subsequent studies hypothesized that bots may
have played a role in the spread of false news and unverified rumors [67,83].
Summary of Results: Sentiment. We further explored how bots and hu-
mans talked about the two presidential candidates. Next, we show the sentiment
analysis results based on SentiStrength. Figure 3 illustrates four settings: the top
(resp., bottom) two panels show the sentiment of the tweets produced by the
bots (resp., humans). Furthermore, the two left (resp., right) panels show the
support for Clinton (resp., Trump). The main histograms in each panel show
the volume of tweets about Clinton or Trump, separately, whereas the insets
show the difference between the two. By contrasting the left and right panels
we note that the tweets mentioning Trump are significantly more positive than
those mentioning Clinton, regardless of whether the source is human or bot.
However, bots tweeting about Trump generated almost no negative tweets and
indeed produced the most positive set of tweets in the entire dataset (about
200,000 or nearly two-third of the total).
The fact that bots produce systematically more positive content in support
of a candidate can bias the perception of the individuals exposed to it, suggesting
that there exists an organic, grassroots support for a given candidate, while in
reality it is in part artificially inflated. Our paper reports various examples of
tweets generated by bots, and the candidate they support [10].
3.2 2017 French Presidential Election
A subsequent analysis of the Twitter ecosystem highlighted the presence and
effects of bots prior to the 2017 French Presidential Election. We next report
our findings summarizing the results published in 2017 [28]. We provide a char-
acterization of both the bots and the users who engaged with them.
Data Collection. By following the same strategy as in the 2016 US Presidential
election [10], we manually selected a set of hashtags and keywords related to the
2017 French Presidential Election. By construction, the list contained a roughly
equal number of terms associated with each of the two candidates, namely Marine
Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron, and various general election-related terms: we
ultimately identified 23 terms, listed in our paper [28]. We collected data by
using the Twitter Search API, from April 27 to the end of election day, on May
7, 2017: This procedure yielded a dataset containing approximately 17 million
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Fig. 3. Distributions of the sentiment of bots (top) and humans (bottom) supporting
the two presidential candidates. The main histograms show the disaggregated volumes
of tweets talking about the two candidates separately, while the insets show the absolute
value of the difference between them (from [10]).
unique tweets, posted by 2,068,728 million unique users. Part of this corpus is
a subset of tweets associated with the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign,
whose details are described in our paper [28]. The timeline of the volume of
posted tweets is illustrated in Figure 4.
Bot Detection. Due to the limitations of the Twitter API, and the time re-
strictions for this short period of unfolding events, we were unable to run in
real time the bot detection relying upon Botometer. For this reason, we car-
ried out a post-hoc bot detection on the dataset using an offline version of the
bot-detection algorithm inspired by Botometer’s rationale. Specifically, we ex-
clusively leveraged user metadata and activity features to create a simple yet
effective bot detection classifier, trained on same data as Botometer, which is
detailed in our paper [28]. We validated its classification accuracy and assessed
that it was similar to Botometer’s performance, with above 80 percent in both ac-
curacy and AUC-ROC scores. Manual validation corroborated the performance
analysis. Hence, we used this simplified bot detection strategy to unveil bots in
the dataset at hand.
Summary: Temporal Dynamics. We started by exploring the timeline of the
general election-related discussion on Twitter. The broader discussion that we
collected concerns the two candidates, Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron,
and spans the period from April 27 to May 7, 2017, the Presidential Election Day,
see Figure 4. Let us discuss first the dashed grey line (left axis): this shows the
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Fig. 4. Timeline of the volume of tweets generated every minute during our observation
period (April 27 through May 7, 2017). The purple solid line (right axis) shows the
volume associated with MacronLeaks, while the dashed grey line (left axis) shows the
volume of generic election-related discussion. The presidential election occurred on May
7, 2017 (from [28]).
volume of generic election-related discussion. The discussion exhibits common
circadian activity patterns and a slightly upwards trend in proximity to Election
Day, and spikes in response to an off-line event, namely the televised political
debate that saw Le Pen facing Macron. Otherwise, the number of tweets per
minute averages between 300 and 1,500 during the day, and quickly approaches
de facto zero overnight, consistently throughout the entire observation window.
Figure 4 also illustrates with the purple solid line (right axis) the volume associ-
ated with MacronLeaks, the disinformation campaign that was orchestrated to
smear Macron’s reputation. The temporal pattern of this campaign is substan-
tially different from the general conversation. First, the campaign is substantially
silent for the entire period till early May. We can easily pinpoint the inception
of the campaign on Twitter, which occurs in the afternoon of April 30, 2017.
After that, a surge in the volume of tweets, peaking at nearly 300 per minute,
happens in the run up to Election Day, between May 5 and May 6, 2017. It is
worth noting that such a peak is nearly comparable in scale to the volume of the
regular discussion, suggesting that for a brief interval of time (roughly 48 hours)
the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign acquired significant attention [28].
Summary: Bot Dynamics. Like in the previous study, we here provide a
characterization of the Twitter activity, this time specifically related to Macron-
Leaks, for both bot and human accounts. In Figure 5, we show the timeline of
the volume of tweets generated respectively by human users (dashed grey line)
and bots (solid purple line), between April 27 and May 7, 2017, and related to
MacronLeaks. The amount of activity is substantially close to zero until May 5,
2017, in line with the first coordination efforts as well as the information leaks
spurred from other social platforms, as discussed in the paper [28]. Spikes in bot-
generated content often appear to slightly precede spikes in human posts, sug-
gesting that bots can trigger cascades of disinformation [67]. At peak, the volume
10 Emilio Ferrara
Fig. 5. Timeline of the volume of tweets generated every minute, respectively by hu-
man users (dashed grey line) and social bots (solid purple line), between April 27
and May 7, 2017, and related to MacronLeaks. Spikes in bot-generated content often
slightly precedes spikes in human posts, suggesting that bots can trigger cascades of
disinformation (from [28]).
of bot-generated tweets is comparable with the that of human-generated ones.
Further investigation revealed that the users who engaged with bots pushed the
MacronLeaks disinformation campaign were mostly foreigners with pre-existing
interest in alt-right topics and alternative news media, rather than French users.
Furthermore, we highlighted an anomalous account usage pattern where hun-
dreds of bot accounts used in the 2017 French Presidential elections were also
present in the 2016 US Presidential Election discussion, which suggested the pos-
sible existence of a black market for reusable political disinformation bots [28].
Summary: Sentiment Dynamics. Identically to the 2016 US Presidential
Election study, we annotated all tweets in this corpus using SentiStrength, and
subsequently studied the evolution of the sentiment of tweets in the 2017 French
Presidential Election discussion. Figure 6 shows the temporal distribution of
tweets’ sentiment disaggregated by intensity: the four panels illustrate the over-
all timeline of the volume of tweets that exhibit positive and negative sentiment
at the hourly resolution, for sentiment polarities ranging from 1 (lowest) to 4
(highest) in both positive and negative spectra. What appears evident is that,
as Election Day approaches, moderately and highly negative tweets (sentiment
scores of -2, -3, and -4) significantly outnumber the moderately and highly pos-
itive tweets, at times by almost an order of magnitude. For example, between
May 6 and 7, 2017, on average between 300 and 400 tweets with significant neg-
ative sentiment (sentiment scores of -3) were posted every hour, compared with
an average of between 10 and 50 tweets with an equivalently positive sentiment
(score scores of +3). Since the discussion during that period was significantly
driven by bots, and bots focused against Macron, our analysis suggested that
bots were pushing negative campaigns against that candidate aimed at smearing
his credibility and weakening his position in the eve of the May 7’s election.
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Fig. 6. Temporal distribution of sentiment disaggregated by sentiment intensity
(hourly resolution). The sign on the y-axis captures the amount of tweets in the positive
(resp., negative) sentiment dimension.
3.3 2018 US Midterms
The notorious investigation on Russian interference led by the US Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) put social media service providers (SMSPs)
at the center-stage of the public debate. According to reports, SMPSs started
to devote more efforts to “sanitize” their platforms, including ramping up the
technological solutions to detect and fight abuse. Much attention has been de-
voted to identifying and suspending inauthentic activity, a term that captures a
variety of tools used to carry out manipulation, including bot and troll accounts.
Hence, it is natural to ask whether these countermeasures proved effective,
or if otherwise the strategies and technologies bots typically used until 2017
evolved, and to what extent they successfully adapted to the changing social
media defenses and thus escaped detection. We recently set to answer these
questions: to this purpose, we monitored and investigated the online activity
surrounding the 2018 US Midterm elections what were held on November 6,
2018.
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Data Collection. We collected data for six weeks, from October 6, 2018 to
November 19, 2018, i.e., one month prior and until two weeks after election day.
Tweets were collected using the Twitter Streaming API and following these key-
words: 2018midtermelections, 2018midterms, elections, midterm, and midterm-
elections. Post-processing and cleaning procedures are described in detail in our
paper [53]: we retained only tweets in English, and manually removed tweets that
were out of context, e.g., tweets related to other countries’ elections (Cameroon,
Congo, Biafra, Kenya, India, etc.) that were present in our initial corpus because
they contained the same keywords we tracked. The final dataset contains 2.6M
tweets, posted by nearly 1M users.
Bot Detection. Similarly to the 2016 US Presidential election study, since
this study was a post-mortem (i.e., not in real time but after the events), we
adopted Botometer to infer the bot scores of the users in our dataset. The only
distinction worth mentioning is that we used the Botometer API version v3 that
brings new features and a non-linear re-calibration of the model: in line with
the associated study’s recommendations [86], we used a threshold of 0.3 (which
corresponds to a 0.5 threshold from previous versions of Botometer) to separate
bots from humans (note that the results remain substantially unchanged if a
higher threshold was used). As a result, we obtained that 21.1% of the accounts
were categorized as bots, which were responsible for 30.6% of the total tweets
in our dataset. Manual validation procedures assessed the reasonable quality of
these annotations. The resulting evidence suggests that bots were still present,
and accounted for a significant amount of the tweets posted in the context of
the political discourse revolving around the 2018 US Midterms.
Interestingly, about 40 thousand accounts were already inactive at the time of
our analysis, and thus we were not able to infer their bot scores using the Twitter
API. We manually verified that 99.4% of them were suspended by Twitter,
corroborating the hypothesis that these were bots as well, and were suspended
by Twitter in the time between the events and our post-mortem analysis, which
was carried out in early 2019.
Political Leaning Inference. Next, we set to determine if bots exhibited a
clear political leaning, and if they acted according to that preference. To label
accounts as conservative or liberal, we used a label propagation approach that
leveraged the political alignment of news sources whose URLs were posted by
the accounts in the dataset. Lists of partisan media outlets were taken from
third-party organizations, namely AllSides.Org and MediaBiasFactCheck.Com.
The details of our label propagation algorithm are explained in our paper [53].
Ultimately, the procedure allowed us to reliably infer, with accuracy above 89%,
the political alignment of the majority of human and bot accounts in our corpus.
These were factored into the subsequent analyses aimed at determining partisan
strategies and narratives (see [53]).
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Fig. 7. K-core decomposition: liberal vs. conservative bots and humans (from [53]).
Summary: Bot Activity and Strategies. Provided the evidence that bots
were still present despite the efforts of the SMSPs to sanitize their platforms,
we aimed at determining the degree to which they were embedded in the human
ecosystem, specifically in the retweet network. This network is of central impor-
tance in our analysis, because it conveys information diffusion dynamics; many
recent studies suggested a connection between bots and the spread of unverified
and false information [67,83]. It is therefore of paramount importance to deter-
mine if bots still played a role in the retweet network of election-related social
media discourse as of 2018.
To this aim, we resorted to perform the k-core decomposition analysis. In
social network theory, a k-core is a subgraph of a graph where all nodes have
degree at least equal to k. The intuition is that, as k grows, one is looking at
increasingly more highly-connected nodes’ subgraphs. Evidence suggests that
high k-cores are associated with nodes that are more embedded, thus influential,
for the network under investigation [84].
If bots were still influential in the 2018 US Midterm election discussion, our
hypothesis is that we would find them in high concentration predominantly into
high k cores. This would be consistent with our findings related to the 2016 US
Presidential Election discussion [10].
Figure 7 corroborates our intuition. Specifically, we show the percentage of
both conservative and liberal human and bot accounts as a function of varying
k. Two patterns are worth discussing: first, as k increases, the fraction of con-
servative bots grows, while the prevalence of liberal bots remains more or less
constant; conversely, the prevalence of human accounts decreases, with growing
k, more markedly for liberal users than conservative ones. We summarize these
findings suggesting that conservative bots were situated in a premium position
in the retweet network, and therefore may have affected information spread [53].
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3.4 2016 vs 2018: A Comparative Bot Analysis
Having identified and analyzed the activity of human and bot accounts in the
context of the political discourse associated to US election events in both 2016
and 2018, it is natural to ask whether these studies involved a similar set of ac-
counts. In other words, it is worth determining whether there exists a continuum
of users that are active in both time periods under investigation. If this is the
case, it would be interesting to study the users present in both periods, deter-
mine whether any of them are the bots under scrutiny in the previous studies,
and ultimately understand if the strategies they may have exhibited evolved,
possibly to escape detection or avoid further scrutiny of SMSPs.
Data Collection. To answer the questions above, we isolated the users present
in both the 2016 and 2018 datasets described above. This process yielded over
278 thousand accounts, active in both periods. Further processing and cleaning
procedures, as detailed in our paper [54], brought the dataset down to 245K
users, accounting for over 8.3M tweets in 2016 and 660K in 2018. Botometer was
used to determine the bot scores of these accounts. As a result, 12.6% of these
accounts scored high in bot scores and were therefore classified as bots. We used
this dataset to study the evolution of behavior of bots over the time period of
study.
Summary: Bot Evolution Dynamics. One advantage of bots over humans is
their scalability. Since bots are controlled by software rather than human users,
as such they can work over the clock, they don’t need to take rests and don’t have
the finite cognitive capacity and bandwidth that dictates how humans operate on
social media [63]. In principle, a bot could post continuously without any break,
or at regular yet tight intervals of time. As a matter of fact, primitive bots used
these simple strategies [65,58]. However, such obvious patterns are easy to spot
automatically, hence not very effective. There is therefore a trade-off between
realistic-looking activity and effectiveness. In other words, one can investigate
the patterns of inter-event time betweet a tweet post and its subsequent, and
lay out the frequency distribution in an attempt to distill the difference between
human and bot accounts’ temporal dynamics.
Figure 8 illustrates the tweet inter-time distribution by bots and humans
in 2016 (left) and 2018 (right). It is apparent that, while in 2016 bots exhib-
ited a significantly different frequency distribution with respect to their human
counterparts, in 2018 this distinction has vanished. In fact, statistical testing of
distribution differences suggests that human and bot temporal signatures are
indistinguishable in 2018. The discrepancy is particularly relevant in the time
range between 10 minutes and three hours, consistent with other findings [63]:
in 2016, bots shared content at a higher rate with respect to human users.
Our work [54] corroborates the hypothesis that bots are continuously chang-
ing and evolving to escape detection. Further examples that we reported also
illustrate other patterns of behavior that have changed between 2016 and 2018:
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Fig. 8. Tweet inter-event time by bots and humans in 2016 (left) and 2018 (right). A
clear distinction in temporal signature between bots and humans was evident in 2016,
but vanished in 2018 (from [54]).
for instance, the sentiment that was expressed in favor or against political can-
didates in 2018 reflects significantly better what the human crowd is expressing.
However, in 2016, bots’ sentiment drastically diverged, in a manner easy to de-
tect, from that of the human’s counterpart, as we discussed earlier.
4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we set to discuss our latest results regarding the role of bots
within online political discourse in association with three major political events.
First, we described the results of our analysis that unveiled a significant
amount of bots distorting the online discussion in relation to the 2016 US Pres-
idential election. We characterized the activities of such bots, and illustrated
how they successfully fostered interactions by means of retweets at the same
rate human users did. Other researchers suggested that this played a role in the
spread of false news during that time frame [67,83].
Second, we highlighted the role of bots in pushing a disinformation campaign,
known as MacronLeaks, in the run up to the 2017 French Presidential election.
We demonstrated how it is possible to easily pinpoint the inception of this disin-
formation campaign on Twitter, and we illustrated how its popularity peak was
comparable with that of regular political discussion. We also hypothesized that
this disinformation campaign did not have a major success in part because it
was tailored around the information needs and usage patterns of the American
alt-right community rather than French-speaking audience. Moreover, we found
that several hundreds of bot accounts were re-purposed from the 2016 US Elec-
tion. Ultimately, we suggested the possibility that a black market for reusable
political bots may exist [28].
Third, we studied the 2018 US Midterms, to investigate if bots were still
present and active. Our analysis illustrated that not only bots were almost as
prevalent as in the two other events, but also that conservative bots played a
central role in the highly-connected core of the retweet network. These findings
further motivated a comparative analysis contrasting the activity of bots and
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humans in 2016 and 2018. Our study highlighted that a core of over 245K users,
of which 12.1% were bots, was active in both events. Our results suggest that
bots may have evolved to better mimic human temporal patterns of activity.
With the increasing sophistication of Artificial Intelligence, the ability of
bots to mimic human behavior to escape detection is greatly enhanced. This
poses challenges for the research community, specifically in the space of bot
detection. Whether it is possible to win this arms race is yet to be determined:
any party with significant resources can deploy state of the art technologies to
enact influence operations and other forms of manipulation of public opinion.
The availability of powerful neural language models lowers the bar to adopt
techniques that allow to build credible bots. For example, it may be already in
principle possible to automatize almost completely the generation of genuine-
looking text. This may be used to push particular narratives, to artificially build
traction for political arguments that may otherwise have little or no human
organic support.
Ultimately, the evidence that our studies, and the work of many other re-
searchers in this field, have brought strongly suggest that more policy and reg-
ulations may be warranted, and that technological solutions alone may not be
sufficient to tackle the issues of bot interference in political discourse.
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